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I - Introduction 
Social sciences are not pure sciences. The analysis of social movements 
demands an identification of the period of time when the movements to be 
considered have taken place, so as to allow for the control of the influence 
from other, related phenomena. Such identification is often associated with 
calendar periods due to several reasons, among others the very availability of 
most data. 
Analysing the Brazilian economy in the 1990s is, however, far more than a 
calendar coincidence. This has been an extremely rich period to study, and a 
number of aspects will remain as object for analyses for a long time yet. 
To start with, the international scenario at the beginning of the decade was 
one of increasing movement of capital flows and technological transformation, 
but the difficulties associated to an unstable domestic macroeconomic 
environment would not allow the Brazilian economy to fully participate in 
neither of these new movements. Also, policy makers were constantly 
reminded of the success of other emerging economies elsewhere, and the 
road to achieve such bonanza seemed quite well paved from the viewpoint of 
several influenciai agents from abroad. 
Domestically, mounting inflation after a number of failed stabilisation plans 
provided ground for varied tentatives to fight inflation. Furthermore, a new 
Constitution brought new fiscal and social features into an already 
complicated economic environment. 
The second half of the decade was characterised, however, by a sharply 
different context. The achievement of price stabilisation coupled to relative 
openness to foreign trade has no precedent in the economic history of the 
country. At the microeconomic level, a number of impressive changes have 
also taken place, all of which have facilitated the access to international 
capital markets and led to a new pattern of growth. 
This chapter aims at discussing these features, in the light of the adjustment 
process that took place during the present decade. A number of aspects 
correspond to what the literature of reforms in developing countries would 
have indicated. But not everything turned out actually as one would have 
predicted or preferred. It is argued that this might have been due to various 
' UN/ECLAC and Universidade de Brasilia. Opinions here are strictly personal and do not 
necessarily correspond to the actual position of these institutions. 
factors, ranging from the design of the policies to the actual perception of the 
market signals by the economic agents. 
The chapter has five sections. The next section presents a brief survey of the 
literature on reforms, in particular the suggestions regarding their timing and 
sequencing. This is followed by a rather lengthy account of the basic features 
of the Brazilian reforms in the 1990s. In the fourth section I discuss some of 
the outcomes which did not exactly correspond to expectations and try to 
identify the causes for it. The fifth section lists some lessons derived from the 
recent Brazilian experience. 
II - The Need to Reform and the Basic Recipes 
Latin American policy makers in general have been exposed during the 
seventies and eighties to a multiple set of pressures. Economic and social 
distortions and inefficiencies, coupled to external constraints aggravated by 
intense movements in the international market for commodities and by 
financial difficulties have consolidated the need to promote substantial 
reforms in these economies. 
Individual countries in the region have experienced different approaches over 
time' but on the whole the design of such reforms had strong influence from 
an orthodox reading of the outcomes of the successful experiences of the 
emerging economies in Southeast Asia. 
According to this view, reforming was to be an immediate task, because the 
sooner the adjustment process was undertaken the lower the costs involved. 
In the words of a Worid Bank authority, "adjustment postponed [is] pain 
compounded''^ 
Market-oriented policy reforms were recommended on the basis of four basic 
arguments^: a) economic liberalisation reduces static inefficiencies arising 
from resource misallocation and waste; b) economic liberalisation enhances 
learning; c) outward-oriented economies are better able to cope with adverse 
external shocks; d) market-based economic systems are less prone to 
wasteful rent-seeking activities. 
Reforming should thus comprise fiscal rectitude, assure sustained free trade 
conditions and reduce to a minimum existing market price distortions. 
Restructuring economies should be provided financial assistance during the 
transition period, so as to reduce the adjustment costs associated with micro 
reforms: adjustment includes reforms of policies and institutions, on the belief 
that "these changes can improve resource allocation, increase economic 
' As witnessed, for instance, by the Chilean, Argentine and Uruguayan opening processes in 
the late seventies and early eighties, as compared to the later trade reforms in Mexico, Bolivia 
and Brazil. 
'Stern (1991), pg.3. 
^Rodrik(1993), pg 7. 
efficiency, expand growth potential and increase resilience in response to 
future shocks"-*. 
Financing agencies and academic mainstream were seen as agreeing in that 
the measures typically called for at the beginning of the process comprised' 
what became to be known as the Washington Consensus: fiscal discipline, 
redirection of public expenditure priorities towards health, education and 
infrastructure, tax reform (broadening the tax base and cutting marginal tax 
rates), providing competitive exchange rates, securing property rights, 
deregulation, trade liberalisation, privatization, elimination of barriers to 
foreign investment and financial liberalisation. 
Such mapping of the ideal path to an undistorted system gives little guidance, 
however, on how to deal with crucial aspects such as^ minimizing the 
adjustment costs, coping with the implications of differential rates of 
adjustment between sectors, the appropriate macro-policy during the reforms 
(and more specifically the management of the exchange rate), and how to 
minimize the welfare consequences of leaving one sector controlled while 
freeing another from state intervention. 
In an ideal world a reformer, say, of trade policies would not have to be 
concerned with these intermediate steps since an optimal policy would consist 
of an immediate jump to free trade, unless there exists specific market 
distortions^ 
In practice, however, a correct designing of the reform process is essential 
not only for the sake of academic evaluations or even to assure the political 
support for the reforms. Credibility is an essential aspect to be considered^ 
Lack of credibility that a reform will last introduces distortions which may be 
self-fulfilling: the reversal of a reform may come about simply for the belief 
that it will have a short life. 
A simple way to illustrate this is with a trade reform expected to be temporary. 
This might lead economic agents to perceive imported goods to be cheaper 
only temporarily, and hence incur debt above the level they would otherwise 
contract, just for reasons of intertemporal substitution in consumption. If 
economic agents have little past experience upon which to draw with regard 
to a more open environment, they have to infer from the experiences of other 
countries. If they are able to borrow against their perceived higher permanent 
income through an open capital account, present consumption will increase'. 
Current account imbalance stemming from such procedure may lead to 
renewed trade barriers, thus reversing the initial movement. 
''Thomas/Chibber/Dallaml/de Melo (1991), pg 12. 
' According to Williamson (1990). 
^Conley/Maloney (1995). 
'lVlussa(1986). 
^ Calvo (1989). 
' Conley/Maloney (1995). 
The need for a recommended path has given birth to a literature on policy 
reforms dealing with the timing and sequencing of reforms, as well as the 
importance of eliminating uncertainty about government intentions. 
Most of the debate has concentrated on the question of whether trade 
liberalisation should precede or follow capital-account liberalisation'®. 
Experience has shown, however, that sharp macroeconomic disequilibrium at 
the beginning of the reform period might affect the outcome. An additional, 
more specific discussion relates therefore such sequencing to an initial 
economic environment of high inflation, and deals with the synchronisation 
between the process of price stabilisation and the reforms". 
Another, related aspect of the discussion about reforms'^ is the relation 
between reforming the domestic financial sector and liberalising the Capital 
Account of the Balance of Payments. In inflationary countries fiscal deficit and 
intervention in the domestic financial market often lead to artificially low 
domestic interest rates. Controls imposed on international capital should 
therefore only be relaxed after the domestic financial market has been 
reformed, the fiscal deficit Is under tight control and real interest rates have 
been raised, so as to avoid large destabilising capital flows. 
If the opening of the capital account takes place when domestic interest rates 
are maintained below their equilibrium level, there will be massive outflow of 
resources. Alternatively, with fiscal deficit under control a reformed domestic 
financial market will operate at equilibrium interest rates. Reducing constraints 
on capital movements will stimulate arbitrage movements leading to an inflow 
of foreign capital. 
There seems to be hence little dispute as to the sequencing between the 
reform of the domestic financial market and the liberalisation of capital 
movements: impediments to capital movements should not be relaxed before 
the domestic financial sector is liberalised'^ 
Several authors have advocated also that the Capital Account liberalisation 
should take place only after trade and other sector distortions have been 
dismantled'". The relaxation of capital controls bringing about substantial 
inflows of capital will induce an increase in the level of aggregate expenditure 
both on tradable and non-tradable goods, generating real exchange rate 
appreciation (therefore less protection to the producers of tradable goods), 
hence precluding or even frustrating the liberalisation of the external trade 
sector'̂  
In which moment should reforms include also other markets, such as the labour market (an 
inevitable step, if trade opening is to remain), does not come out so clearly from the literature. 
" A matter of great interest for Brazil in the early nineties. 
Largely influenced by the Chilean experience in the early eighties. 
Edwards/Edwards (1987) and Edwards (1990). 
'" McKinnon (1982) 
An alternative way of presenting this argument follows from the pace of adjustment in the 
goods and the financial markets: since the former takes more time to clear than the latter, a 
While the opening of the Capital Account often generates a real appreciation 
of the exchange rate, it follows both from theory as well as from experience'^ 
in various trade policy reform episodes that a successful trade liberalisation 
generally requires real devaluation of the domestic currency. 
In principle therefore, trade reform should come before the dismantling of 
controls over foreign capital flows. But this conclusion still leaves ground to 
other two questions. 
First, it is not quite clear from this debate whether a gradual reform is more 
desirable than an abrupt one. What is at stake is the actual outcome and the 
sustainability of the process. As Edwards (1990) puts it, it is possible that 
gradualism has characteristics that may either enhance or compromise the 
credibility of the reforms, depending on the actual conditions in each country: 
by reducing unemployment and allowing for a fiscal equilibrium, a gradual 
reform will tend to be more credible; but at the same time a slow reform might 
allow the groups negatively affected by the new policies to organise and lobby 
against those policies. 
A second aspect is the relation between reforms and disinflation. Economic 
theory provides little guidance in this regard. But experience would suggest'^ 
that in economies with sharp macroeconomic problems reforms should be 
initiated only when sufficient progress has been made to reduce such 
imbalances: instability reduces the benefits of reforms aimed at improving the 
allocation of resources via changes in relative prices. 
Insofar as trade liberalisation - the first step in the proposed reform scheme -
is concerned there are three arguments to postponing it until inflation has 
been controlled'^ First, the above mentioned relative-price variability affecting 
the transmission of efficiency benefits. Second, trade liberalisation might 
negatively affect fiscal revenues, if the reduction or elimination of taxes on 
trade surpasses tax revenue accruing from the improved trade activity. Third, 
liberalisation requires a compensating exchange rate devaluation to protect 
the Current Account, at the same time that domestic price stabilisation would 
benefit from cheaper imports favoured by an appreciated exchange rate. 
It is the exchange rate argument which is the most relevant for some detailed 
consideration here. From the theoretical viewpoint, this is the one which might 
impose the most serious constraint on trade liberalisation'^ Furthermore, for 
the present purposes it is directly related to understanding the Brazilian 
experience since 1994. 
homogeneous reform would call for the goods markets to be liberalized before financial 
markets (J.Frenkel, cited in Edwards (1990)). 
Chomski/Michaley/Papageorgiou (1986). Real devaluation of the domestic currency is 
considered a necessary condition for successful trade liberalization. 
''Corbo/Fischer(1992). 
'^Rodrik (1993b). 
" See the discussion in Rodrik (1993b). 
The debate about reforming in a context of stabilisation policies has focused 
on whether reforms can assist the disinflation process: trade liberalisation 
may help disinflation by forcing convergence between domestic and external 
price variation in tradable goods; however, whereas trade liberalisation calls 
for a compensating exchange rate depreciation (in view of the downward 
rigidity of wages) domestic price stabilisation requires, on the contrary, that 
devaluation of the exchange rate be avoided. The exchange rate can thus be 
used either as an instrument to achieve a real target (in which case it follows 
the price and wage setting process) or as a nominal anchor for the domestic 
price level (in which case it leads that process). 
Furthermore, if coupled to financial liberalisation-" the real appreciation of the 
exchange rate will: a) tend to compromise the credibility of the liberalisation 
episode and b) after a initial overshooting of capital inflow expectations of a 
real depreciation will lead to higher real interest rates, at a time when the real 
side is going through the costly adjustment that follows the liberalisation of 
trade restrictions^'. 
This exchange rate dilemma may be illusory, however, if exchange rate 
overvaluation is considered as a price to be paid to assure the credibility of 
the processai If the inflationary process has a strong inertia linked to the 
indexation or accommodation of key nominal variables^^ to the lagged 
variations in the price level, a credible commitment should not only take care 
of inflation, but also remove the nominal rigidities that require the use of 
devaluation for competitiveness purposes. 
From this perspective an overvaluation of the exchange rate may be viewed 
as not being an independent source of risk. To a public which has seen many 
disinflation plans fail for the lack of political will an ambitious package that 
attacks all inflationary sources may signal the presence of a government with 
clear decisions and well defined policies. This also makes a reversal less 
likely in case of temporary setbacks. Hence-' the use of the exchange rate as 
a nominal anchor may not be necessarily in conflict with trade liberalisation, 
since if such anchor works nominal wage rigidity will eventually disappear, 
improving the likeliness of sustained competitiveness. 
Two last observations regarding reforms have to do with the facts that a) open 
policies generate their own constituencies^^ - as new profit opportunities will 
appear, the entrepreneurs that benefit from the post-reform scenario will fight 
against any attempted reversal; b) a reformed system does not necessarily 
mean the elimination of rent-seeking activities - as long as governments 
implement policies, individuals will try to obtain benefits for themselves^®. 
The elimination of inflationary gains resulting from a successful stabilization process may 
lead the financial sector to look for other sources of financing. 
Edwards/Edwards (1987). 
Rodrik (1993b). 
" Wages, monetary aggregates, the exchange rate. 
^̂  Rodrik (1993b). 
" Rodrik (1992). 
Rodrik (1993a). 
Ill - The Brazilian Economy in the 1990s: An Overview 
The 1990s are considered as 'the decade of reforms' in Brazil. Although some 
tentative action took place in the late eighties - as is the case, for instance, 
with foreign trade liberalisation and early privatisation - clearly the most 
significant steps were taken after 1990. 
This decade has been a turning point in the economic history of the country. 
Having been in the previous four decades a closed economy with large 
presence of the State as producer of goods and services and after a long 
record of indexed high inflation, by the end of the nineties Brazil has become 
an economy rather open to trade of goods and capital, with the simultaneous 
reduction of the role of the State as a direct producer. 
Furthermore, the economy has also achieved unprecedented price 
stabilisation that has lasted for five years now: consumer price index 
increased a record 2489% in 1993, but was gradually reduced to single digit 
figures since 1996, having varied only 2.6% in 1998. 
The reforms and their effects cannot be understood without taking into 
consideration the massive impact of such price stabilisation: a) it provided a 
'wealth effect' that affected both consumers and producers, b) the stable 
macroeconomic scenario created a political environment favourable to 
reforms and c) induced confidence on domestic and foreign investors, at the 
same time that d) it eliminated the impressive inflationary gains accruing to 
the government and the banking sector, with important consequences for 
monetary and fiscal policies, as well as for the design of new, sharp 
regulations for the financial sector as a whole. 
The literature on policy reforms often adopts a taxonomic approach, 
identifying several levels of reforms. According to this view, Brazil is about to 
complete its first generation reforms, starting with trade policy reform and the 
privatisation of State firms in the late 1980s, but intensifying the whole 
process since the early 1990s. It has also taken several steps towards second 
generation reforms, such as social security reform, administrative reform of 
the public sector, and tax policy reform. 
Other policy changes have taken place in the same period with important 
consequences for the economy. Social programs were significantly re-
designed to cope with new universal rights assured by the 1988 Constitution, 
to circumvent fiscal difficulties and to redistribute the burden of service 
provision between the federal government and local states and municipalities. 
In the social area, as well as in other areas - such as science and technology 
- there has been an increasing (although insufficient) involvement of the 
private sector in the financing of several activities. Recent fiscal results and 
the forecasts for the coming years would suggest that this is a characteristic 
which might become more intense in the future. 
This is not to say that reforms went necessarily in the correct direction, that 
they were well implemented and even less that they are complete by now. But 
there is no denying of how substantially the whole productive environment has 
changed in recent years, due to these reforms. 
Chart 1 - BRAZIL: ONE DECADE OF REFORMS 
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Note: Asterisks indicate the approximate date of the main measures regulating each reform, 
not the moment of highest intensity of changes. This is important to keep in mind, for 
instance, in the case of privatisation, far more intense in 1998 in terms of the value actually 
transacted than at any time before. 
One might ask why was there such concentration of reforms in this particular 
period of time. The answer has to do with the increasing perception by 
domestic economic agents - government officials, entrepreneurs and 
academic analysts - of the need to change. The international economic 
environment is certainly also part of the answer. The conjunction of the final 
stages of multilateral negotiations, renewed access to financing by other Latin 
American countries and fiscal policies elsewhere-" has acted as an additional 
stimulus to reformers. 
Reforming (privatisation and social security reforms in particular) required 
important changes to be made to the Constitution. It demanded therefore 
political will and power that could only be achieved on the basis of the already 
mentioned consensus among economic agents. 
Chart 1 shows the sequencing of the major reforms. The process started with 
trade policy reform and in the early 1990s some sporadic tentative movement 
to privatise public assets, followed by the opening of the capital account of the 
Balance of Payments. Second generation reforms begun only in the second 
half of the decade with social security and administrative reforms, as well as 
the regulation of the financial sector and a series of changes in a number of 
social programs, comprising education, health and poverty alleviation. 
Trade liberalisation started in 1987, with the first change in thirty years of the 
nominal tariff structure, and a phasing down of tariff rates accelerating since 





There were two moments when the process of tariff reduction was 
accelerated - in 1990 and again in late 1994. In both cases one of the major 
arguments for doing so was to provoke a shock of competitiveness on 
domestic producers, breaking down monopolistic positions and using trade 
policy as a complementary tool for the price stabilisation process^'. Trade 
reform in 1990 was broadened so as to comprise also the elimination of non-
tariff barriers and a number of incentives to export, as well as a significant 
reform of the institutional framework dealing with foreign trade policy. The 
1994 reform led to a partial anticipation^" of the Mercosur's Common External 
Tariff, which would otherwise enter operation in January 1995. 
The analysis of the impact of trade reform on the trade balance is therefore 
not straightforward, because a) given the peculiarities of the large domestic 
market that had been closed for so many years, it took some time until 
imports reached a significant value; b) export growth was the outcome of two 
simultaneous processes, the multilateral tariff reduction and the regional 
" Taxes and interest rate differentials were a major stimulus to international financial 
arbitrage movements. 
A full account of the changes in trade policy in the nineties would have to consider also that 
for the first time in its history Brazil was committed to a regional integration process, with 
some important additional consequences. 
" Some criticism remain with regard to the way these changes actually took place. See 
Baumann et alii (1997) for a detailed account of tariff reforms in 1994-96. 
^°To September, 1994. 
preferences within iVlercosur; c) price stabilisation after 1994 provoked a 
'wealth effect', which affected domestic demand for imported goods; d) the 
exchange rate policy maintained throughout the period a good deal of 
overvaluation, affecting foreign trade. 
Chart 2 
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With those preliminary remarks, suffice it to notice that trade surpluses which 
averaged US$ 13 billion in 1992-1994 turned into average trade deficits of 
US$ 6 billion in 1995-1998". Import coefficient'- went up from 5.5% in 1990-93 
to 7.2% in 1995-97 (Chart 2). The most intensely demanded imported items 
were raw materials and intermediate products, capital goods and automobiles. 
The importance of this import structure for the domestic investment cycle and 
for some productive sectors will be discussed later on. 
Trade reform was significant and did help to i) increase the import component 
of domestic production", which ii) foster labour productivity - Bonelli (1998) 
estimates that labour productivity in the manufacturing sector has increased at 
an annual rate of 8.7% in 1991-97, as compared to 0.3% on average in 1981-
89 and to 5.6% in the eariy seventies - and iii) increase consumer surplus 
(total imports of consumer goods increased from US$ 2.6 billion in 1990 to 
US$ 11 billion in 1998), but its impact on exports was surpassed by the 
overvaluation of the exchange rate^'' and the increase in (mostly 
manufacturing) wages". 
Despite of the continued export expansion - 6% yearly growth on average in 1994-98 - and 
the improvement of the terms of trade (almost 20% between 1991 and 1995). 
Total imports/GDP {%). 
" Data from IBGE indicate that in 1990 only 11% of gross fixed capital formation in machinery 
and equipment corresponded to imported goods. In 1997 that percentage reached 41% 
(Sáinz/Calcagno (1999)). 
Exchange rate policy during the 1990s was rather varied. Starting from an initial position of 
letting the market determine the equilibrium rate (as an additional tool for breaking a long-
standing indexation process) the government was soon led to adopt a band system that 
experienced some changes over time. In January 1999 external pressure based on the 
accumulated overvaluation led to new freely-floating system. 
" A Bilateral Real-USDollar index deflated by wholesale price indexes based in mid-1994 
would show overvaluation from July, 1994 to March, 1996, reaching a maximum of 17 
percentage points by February 1995. Bonelli/Fonseca (1998) present some qualification to 
this argument: while labour competitiveness increased 62% in 1990-96, the average wage in 
US dollars increased 84%, which means that productivity gains were surpassed by labour 
The early 1990s have witnessed also a major concern of policy makers in 
creating the conditions for the Brazilian economy to take advantage of the 
then increasing facilities in the access to international capital markets. 
Brazil had since the 1950s been among the developing countries with highest 
participation of foreign capital in its productive structure'\ Until the end of the 
1970s it was one of the greatest absorbers of foreign investment. That has 
changed during the crisis of the eighties, and there was a widespread 
perception that the economy missed the opportunities created by financial 
globalisation, more intense during that decade than in any other period^'. 
This led to a number of specific policy measures creating favourable 
conditions to attract portfolio investment, starting in 1991. As a result, portfolio 
investment flows - less than US$ 800 million until 1992 - already in 1993 
came close to US$ 7 billion. The capital account of the Balance of Payments 
changed the systematic deficits experienced in 1985-91-® into a surplus of 
US$ 25 billion in 1992. 
It is worth noticing that this was a period of rather limited economic activity: 
GDP growth rates in 1991 and 1992 were respectively 1% and -0.3%, 
reaching 4.5% in 1993. The inflow of resources was thus largely the outcome 
of changes in the domestic legislation", and of the relatively low prices of 
stocks of Brazilian companies, after several years of inflation and low growth. 
Recovery of the domestic economic activity^", coupled to the opportunities 
created by the privatisation process soon led foreign direct investment to 
surpass portfolio capital inflows. Yearly flows of about US$ 900 million in 
1990-93 went up to US$ 2.2 billion in 1994, US$ 3.3 billion in 1995, and then 
boomed to unprecedented US$ 9.6 billion in 1996, US$ 17 billion in 1997 and 
US$ 26 billion in 1998. 
This massive inflow of foreign capital helped finance most of the recurrent and 
increasing Current Account deficits: from less than 1% of GDP in 1993 and 
1994 it rose steadily, reaching close to 4.5% of GDP in 1997. 
costs. In other words, the reduction in competitiveness was not due only nor predominantly to 
exchange rate overvaluation: industrial wages deflated by wholesale price index increased 
76% in that period, compared to a 5% appreciation of the Real against the Dollar. 
^̂  It has been estimated (Chudnovsky/Lopez (1997)) that in 1995 92% of total sales by the 
automobile industry, 59% of the pharmaceutical industry, 56% of the sales of electrical 
appliances and 44% of beverages and tobacco in Brazil were associated to foreign-owned 
firms. 
Brazil's share of total world foreign direct investment was as follows: 1970-75 5.1%; 1976-
80 6.3%; 1981-85 4.4%; 1986-90 1.2%; 1991-95 1.3%; 1996 2.7%, according to UNCTAD, 
World Investment Report, several issues. 
^̂  Thanks to the amortisations of the external debt. 
As well as international liquidity. 
GDP growth rates went from -0.3% in 1992 to an average 4.5% in the next four years. 
The new favourable conditions granted to foreign investors coupled to the 
favourable international environment led to early expectations of massive 
participation of foreigners in the process of privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises. As a matter of fact, this was one of the major political obstacles to 
the program in its early moments, but actual results proved those fears to be 
excessive, since until as late as 1995 the participation of foreign investors In 
the National Privatisation Program mounted to less than 1% of total 
revenues'". 
Privatisation efforts started in the early 1980s-'% but it was only in the mid-
1990s that the process became really significant. In 1991-98 total revenue 
accruing from the privatisation program totalled US$ 58 billion (for federal 
government companies), plus US$ 29 billion revenue from local state firms. 
This involved a total of US$ 70 billion worth of assets sold plus US$ 17 billion 
of transferred debt (see Table 1). 
in 1991-94, a relatively small number (32) of firms have been privatised, 
providing a total revenue of US$ 8.6 billion. But this was the phase when 
privatisation in the manufacturing sector was completed, with the selling of all 
relevant state-owned enterprises: firms in the steel, petrochemical and 
fertiliser sectors corresponded to over 90% of the activities of the State as 
entrepreneur. One peculiar aspect in this phase was that one-third of the 
revenue corresponded to federal bonds^\ 
The total amount of resources - over US$ 87 billion, in seven years'*^ - makes 
this one of the biggest privatisation processes in the world, which will certainly 
have significant impact on the productive sector. The whole process had a 
double-sided logic: firms were sold to improve overall efficiency, but in several 
cases there were strong fiscal reasons'". 
The successful anti-inflationary plan and the privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises have however failed to produce the positive effects on fiscal 
accounts that other countries have experienced. On one hand, fiscal revenues 
were indexed before stabilisation''^ On the other hand, some expenditures 
have increased after stabilisation, such as wages in the public sector"' and 
According to Giambiagi/Pinheiro (1998)). 
In 1979 the government created the Special Secretariat for the Control of State Enterprises 
(SEST), with a mandate to curtail state enterprises. It was not until 1981 that the first "Special 
Privatization Commission" was created (Pinheiro/Giambiagi (1998)). 
For a detailed account of the whole process of privatisation in Brazil see Pinheiro (1996) 
And with a number of significant firms still to be sold, in the energy and telecommunications 
sectors. 
For instance, privatisation at the state level was important for its more pronounced fiscal 
impact: while federal-owned firms showed a fiscal surplus equal to 0.1% of GDP on average 
in 1995/98, local state firms recorded a deficit of 0.5% of GDP in the same period. See 
Pinheiro/Giambiagi (1998). 
The 'Olivera-Tanzi effect' associated with the end of inflationary processes was small: in the 
inflationary years this effect was actually positive, given that indexed revenues coupled to 
delays in payments granted extra gains to the government. 
Wage policy in the public sector in 1995 (with wages being adjusted in accordance to 
previous inflation) is estimated to have added some 15-20% to the wage bill. Furthermore, the 
sharp increase of minimum wage in that same year also affected social security expenditures. 
expenditures with social security, reform of the health sector and the 
adjustment of the financial sector. 
Table 1 - Brazil: Privatisation Program - 1991-1998 
(US$ millions) 
Sector Number Assets Transferred Total 
of Firms Sold Debt 
Steel 8 5562 2625 8187 
Petrochemicals 27 2698 1003 3701 
Electric Power 3 3907 1670 5577 
Railways 6 1697 — 1697 
Mining 2 3305 3559 6864 
Telecommunications 21 26970 2125 29095 
Other 14 2442 344 2786 
Federal Firms 81 46581 11326 57907 
State Firms 26 23724 5311 29035 
Total 107 70305* 16637 86942* 
Source: A.Pinheiro, F.Giambiagi (1998), and www.bndes.gov.br 
{*) includes sales of minoritary participations 
As a consequence, fiscal balance deteriorated from a surplus of 1.4% of GDP 
in 1994 to a deficit of about 8% of GDP in 1998. Nominal interest rates 
needed to finance such deficif^ have as a result remained at very high 
leveis"', often surpassing 3% per month, with monthly inflation rates around 
0.3% (and even negative, in several months in 1997 and 1998). 
The end of inflationary transfers to the banking sector^" that followed price 
stabilisation led monetary authorities to create new mechanisms to avoid a 
systemic crisis in the financial sector. The rapid fall in inflation rate allowed for 
a rapid demand for money: the broadest monetary concept (i\/l4) was by 1998 
twice as high (in real terms) as in 1994. Also, credit to the private sector had 
increased fourfold in those four years. 
These two items taken together are estimated to have added some 2% of GDP to total 
government expenditure (Baumann/Mussi (1999)). 
^̂  As well as neutralise the monetary impact of the inflow of foreign resources. 
" 'And increased sharply even further as a response to external shocks in 1995, 1997 and 
1998. 
Transfers which accrued from the fall in the real value of deposits. It is estimated that those 
transfers corresponded to 4% of GDP in 1990-93, having disappeared since 1995. 
Chart 3 
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This increase in credit comprises however both normal financing and a 
significant amount of resources used for adjusting the banking sector. The 
elimination of inflationary gains coupled to the sharp increase in interest rates 
(Chart 3) since March, 1995^' has brought enormous difficulties to several 
private and public banks, making the restructuration of the banking sector a 
necessary step". 
Monetary authorities had to intervene in several institutions, and a number of 
instruments have been devised. The most important policy tools have been 
credit programs to finance troubled institutions, both at federal and local state 
levels, coupled to an induced re-designing of the sector as a whole, via the 
fusion and selling of private and public banks with liquidity problems". This led 
to the elimination of most of the financial institutions belonging to local states 
governments. As an outcome of this process the banking system was able to 
face the 1997-98 external shocks with a 35% credits/total assets coefficient 
and a 13% capital/reserves ratio'". 
Macroeconomic adjustment had spillover effects also on social expenditure. 
At the beginning of the decade social policies were characteristically financed 
via monetary transfers. The huge numbers of potential clients faced a system 
strongly dependent on contributions", with multiple organisms and service 
networks and a strong concentration (2/3) of resources in the federal 
government, all of which led to mistargeting social programs. Furthermore, the 
multiplicity of social funds and their link with specific expenditure lines made 
resources for social expenditure highly sensitive to the business cycle®®. 
Monthly average nominal rates for overnight operations went up from 3.2% in February to 
4.4% in March, 1995. 
" The proportion of non-performing operations increased from less than 9% of total loans to 
almost 14% by the end of 1995 (Baumann/Mussi (1999)). 
" A total of 42 banks (out of a total of 271) were affected, from July 1994 to December 1997. 
Higher than the Basle Committee recommended 8% ratio. 
" Fixed percentages of wages and profits, as well as other quasi-fiscal sources of revenue. 
'''Draibe(1999). 
The 1988 Constitution reduced the links between contributions and the 
system financing", made access to social sen/ices a universal right and 
established minimum levels for social benefits. The most radical change has 
taken place in the health area, with the creation of the Unified Health System, 
comprising both health services and social security. 
In the eady 1990s there was ironically intense legislative activity to regulate 
the new Constitutional determinations, in parallel with sharp reduction of 
social expenditures'^ as well as of the institutional apparatus for the provision 
of social services. By the mid-1990s a new strategy for social development 
was adopted, taking into account the right to universal access to basic social 
services, and comprising employment and income programs for generating 
new opportunities, with priority given to universal programs-^ 
Since 1994, and despite the fiscal difficulties faced by local States and 
municipalities, they have been increasingly absorbing responsibilities in the 
financing of social programs, thus reducing the amount of resources 
contributed by the central governmenf". Table 2 illustrates the distribution of 
social expenditure by administrative levels and percentage of GDP. 
According to figures in Table 2 in 1995 the federal government was still 
responsible for most of the expenditure in 8 out of 14 social programs. In 1995 
social expenditure by federal, state and municipal governments together 
corresponded to 21% of GDP, 85% of which on education, health, social 
security, and benefits to public servants. 
Price stabilisation and political will have allowed for better focusing and higher 
selectivity of programs, new expenditure procedures, and clearer technical 
criteria for the allocation of resources. Social programs concentrate on two 
lines of action - investment In human resources and social assistance and 
programs to fight poverty. 
Education has always been a bottleneck in Brazil's development process. The 
very dimensions of the country, poor quality of educational services, 
inadequate curricula in comparison to market demands, strong distortions in 
financing and expenditures®' are all long standing characteristics of the 
' 'Although financing remain still very dependent (58% in 1996) upon such contributions. 
Social expenditure by the federal government fell from 11.4% of GDP in 1990 to 9.7% in 
1992, a recessive period. Individual areas were affected in different manners: while federal 
expenditures in the health sector, food and sewage and water supply were in 1993 between 
50 and 60% of their corresponding value in 1989, expenditure with social security had actually 
doubled in the same period (Draibe (1999)). 
' ' The social expenditure/GDP ratio increased some 4% between 1990-91 and 1996-97 
(coming close to 20%). In the same period the share of social expenditure on total public 
expenditure remained approximately the same (59%) (CEPAL (1999)). 
This has been made possible by the higher transfer of resources from the federal 
government to states and municipalities, as well as by the improvement of their fiscal 
revenue: in 1980 states absorbed 25% and municipalities 9.6% of total revenue; in 1991 
those shares had become 27% and 16%, respectively (Draibe (1999)). 
As an illustration, public educational expenditure per capita is estimated as US$ 223. But 
that reflects US$ 870 per student at the basic level and US$14,303 per university student. 
(Figures refer to 1995; see Draibe (1999)). 
educational system. A major goal for reform in education is the 
decentralisation of expenditures, unevenly distributed among the three 
administrative levels of government. 
Table 2 - Brazil; Composition (%) of Social Public Expenditure, 
By Government Level - 1995 
Programs Federal States Municipalities Total Social 
Expenditure/ 
GDP (%) 
Social Security 99 1 0 5.4 
Benefits to Public Servants 57 37 6 4.7 
Education 25 47 28 4.3 
Health 63 21 16 3.4 
Housing 4 14 82 1.1 
Employment 98 2 0 0.5 
Social Assistance 34 40 26 0.4 
Urban Transportation 18 15 67 0.4 
Sewage & Water Supply 24 21 56 0.2 
Agrarian Organisation 95 5 0 0.2 
Nutrition 96 1 3 0.1 
Science & Technology 100 0 0 0.1 
Environment 16 52 32 0.1 
Human Resources 100 0 0 
Qualification 
Source: Draibe (1999); rows might not equal 100 due to rounding 
Health is one of the sectors most affected by the 1988 Constitution. The right 
to health having become a universal feature imposed new challenges to an 
already troubled area. Financing sources are varied, comprising contribution 
out of wages and profits, specific taxes and a number of other, varied 
sources. Reform in the health sector concentrates on the re-designing of 
sources of financing" and on increasingly focusing services on preventive 
health actions. The share of municipalities in total expenditure in the health 
sector increased by more than 50% between 1990 and 1995 (although in 
1995 some 60% still corresponded to the federal government)". 
The need for reforming the social security system became clear in the late 
1980s, provoked by a number of determining factors: until then the system 
incorporated contributors at rates that surpassed the growth of beneficiaries 
and even the growth of the labour force, there has been a significant 
demographic change in the population, and the 1988 Constitution 
incorporated rural workers into the system®"^. The number of new rural retirees 
" The recent tax on cheques is the nnost well-known example. 
" It is estimated that the number of persons covered by private health plans has increased 
fourfold in ten years, reaching 45 million people in 1998. This reflects more a discontent with 
the state system than actual planning (The Economist, May 1999). 
" The value of retirement pension is estimated on the basis of the last 36 months of 
contribution to the system, up to a limit of approximately US$ 1000. Civil servants can, 
was dose to 2 million people between 1991 and 1995, the value of the 
average pension doubled during that period and it comprised one-third of the 
rural population in retiring age (Dias/Amaral (1999)). 
Furthermore, life expectancy of the population has increased in recent 
decades. Since the system allows for retirement on the basis of years of 
service, it turns out that 2/3 of retirees were 54 years old in 1995, with a life 
expectancy of another 22 years. Expenditures with social security absorbed in 
1998 some 10% of GDP®', with the number of actual beneficiaries reaching 19 
million people. Social security deficit corresponded in 1998 to approximately 
3% of GDP, most of it (75%) due to benefits paid to public servants. 
Reform of the social security system comprised therefore the definition of a 
limit value for pensions and minimum age for retirement. IVIilitary personnel 
were also forced into start contributing. 
Price stabilisation and trade opening have (predictably) fostered economic 
activity and investment, both via the increase in domestic demand for 
consumer goods, and by easing the access to cheaper imported capital 
goods''®. 
Most firms in the manufacturing sector experienced in the early 1990s (1990-
92, mostly) a process of rationalisation of production, as one of the tools to 
face competitive imports. When inflation disappeared returns to investment 
were relatively high, due to the lower cost of equipment and parts, to the fact 
that most firms had already undergone a rationalisation process and that the 
new equipment helped to overcome the technological gap of the productive 
sector. This helped to foster factor productivity in manufacturing, even at the 
cost of making the sector more capital-intensive"^'. 
industrial investment concentrated essentially in modernisation, with only 
limited productive capacity expansion in some specific sectors^l The ranking 
of sectors by capital formation show a different picturing than the one 
observed in previous investment cycles, such as in the 1970s. Table 3 shows 
the basic information. 
differently, retire and earn the equivalent of their last wage. Rural workers are assured 
retirement but do not contribute. Resource transfer that followed from the inclusion of rural 
workers to social security scheme are considered as having been a major contribution to 
reducing the percentage of households below poverty line from 41% in 1990 to 20% in 1996 
as estimated in CEPAL (1999). 
" When both public and private regimes are taken into account. 
An effect amplified by the exchange rate overvaluation throughout most of the second half 
of the decade 
Bonelli/Fonseca (1998) estimate that the yearly increase in total factor productivity went up 
from an average of 1% in the 1980s to 2.1% in 1990-97. According to Neri/Camargo (1999a) 
industrial output grew 10% between 1991 and 1995, whereas industrial employment fell 22% 
in the same period, leading to a 40% increase in labour productivity. 
In some sectors - such as the automobile industry - there has been actually some 
'greenfield' investment, motivated by fiscal incentives. But in most sectors investment projects 
essentially aimed at modernisation. 
Sectors which led investment in the 1970s - manufacturing, mining and 
petroleum - actually reduced their share in gross capital formation in the 
1990s. Investment in infrastructure (electric power, telecommunications, 
transportation and sewage and water supply) was reduced in 1990-94 to 
between half and one third of the amounts observed in the 1970s. Comparing 
the first and second half of the 1990s one finds a sharp absolute fall in 
investment in electric power, a rather stable pattern in transportation and 
sewage and water supply and a sharp increase in telecommunications. 
Within manufacturing, consumer goods led the pace (the most dynamic 
segments being durable goods, led by transnational companies), stimulated 
by the impressive 'wealth effect' stemming from price stabilisation®'. 
Unfavourable results obtained to intermediate goods and capital goods. 
Table 3 - Brazil: Gross Fixed Capital Formation - 1970-1997 
(percentage of GDP; from constant 1980 prices) 
1970-80 1981-89 1990-94 1995-97 
Manufacturing 4.5 3.2 2.0 3.3 
Mining 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Petroleum 0.9 1.0 0.4 0.4 
Infrastructure 5.4 3.7 2.3 2.2 
of which: 
Electric Power 2.1 1.6 0.9 0.6 
Telecommunications 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.7 
Transportation 2.1 1.5 0.8 0.8 
Sewage&Water Supply 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Source: Bielschowsky (1998) 
The three new elements affecting investment in the second half of the nineties 
are the new role played by incentives granted by local states™ and 
municipalities, the post-privatisation environment, and the import component 
of investment and production processes. Another important feature of 
industrial investment since the mid-1990s is that a good deal of it is 
associated to further exploitation of the country (static) comparative 
advantages in natural resources^'. 
The only exception being textiles. 
™ Which have played a decisive role in the unprecedented geographical re-location of 
productive plants the country has been experiencing in recent years. 
" According to Bielschowsky (1998) total fixed investment in manufacturing at constant 1980 
prices averaged 3.3% of GDP in 1995-97. The group of 'dynamic' sectors formed by 
producers of Steel Products, Transportation Material, Processed Food, Electric and Electronic 
Material, Plastics Pharmaceutical Products and Textiles invested on average some 2.1% of 
GDP, whereas the producers of Chemical Products, Machinery, Non-Metallic products. Pulp 
and Paper, and Rubber Products invested on average only 0.77% of GDP in the same period. 
This raises the question as to what extent has the model of industrial growth 
in recent years become based on the endowment of natural resources and 
thus dependent on the international commodity market^\ A less dynamic 
pattern raises doubts as to the sustainability over time of such model, as well 
as to its vulnerability to external market fluctuations. A relevant point is 
therefore the actual conditions of the economy to support an alternative model 
that favoured more technology-intense products. 
Until the late 1980s scientific and technological policy in Brazil was 
concentrated in building up the infrastructure for R&D. Two lines of action 
were undertaken: a) resources for the financing of R&D projects by firms 
(largely affected by the 1980s crises) and b) fiscal incentives. 
During the 1990s the institutional structure related to innovation and research 
has undergone several changes, mainly due to the reduction of the role of 
federal government: in 1990 it was responsible for 73% of the investments in 
research and development of new products (R&D); in 1997 that share had 
been reduced to 64%. 
Part of such reduction has been compensated by a more active role of the 
private sector. The share of firms in R&D expenditures increased from 15% to 
20% in 1990-97, corresponding to an average 0.7% of total sales. 
Furthermore, the impressive number of ISO 9000 Certificates held by 
Brazilian firms" and the increase in private expenditures with technology and 
capital goods reflect the concern with modernisation of productive plants'^ But 
local firms did not as a whole develop their own innovative capacity to enter 
new markets. 
The discussion about potential R&D supply is fundamental for any developing 
country, and even more so for an economy with 2/3 of its exports consisting of 
industrial goods. But in the recent Brazilian experience three effects seem to 
have contributed to such unfavourable outcome: the negative impact of fiscal 
adjustment (which meant fewer public resources to finance R&D activities), 
reforms in the legislation facilitating imports of technology" (as part of the 
process of opening the economy) and the composition of expo^ts^^ with an 
increasing share of natural resources-intensive products. 
^̂  As different, for instance, from the strategies followed in other emerging economies and in 
Brazil in previous decades, i.e. the provision of stimuli for (producers and) exporters to enter 
new, dynamic markets. 
" About 2500 Certificates until 1997 (Tigre et alii (1999a)). 
Although positive, such results compare rather poorly with other countries. The R&D/sales 
ratio for OECD countries comes close to 2%, and even other emerging economies present a 
higher commitment with technology: in South Korea the share of the private sector in R&D 
reaches 80%. 
" In 1991 and again in 1993 specific norms have facilitated technology transfer contracts 
between foreign subsidiaries in Brazil and their matrix companies (see Tigre et all! (1999) for 
a description of the major changes in legislation). 
The elimination of a number of export incentives has led to a more 'passive' participation in 
the international division of labour. 
The argument may be illustrated as follows''. Firstly, comparing the productive 
structure of the manufacturing sector in 1980 and in 1994 it turns out that 
there was a reduction in the share of traditional industries (from 35% to 31%), 
but the relative weight of electronic industries"' is still rather limited (8% in 
1994), largely surpassed by Chemicals (20%) and Automobiles (10%). 
Secondly, comparing the rates of growth of output between 1990 and 1996 
the best performance is to be found in the producers of consumer durables 
(9%), whereas for the producers of capital goods growth was virtually nil and 
for the manufacturing sector as a whole it was less than 2%. As a 
consequence, the relative importance of industrial sectors when classified by 
end-use of their production varied as indicated in Table 4. 
Table 4 - Structure of Value of Production by Types of Industries 
1989 1994 
Commodities 32.5 34.4 
Durable Consumer Goods 13.0 14.9 
Capital Goods 11.5 6.7 
Traditional Goods 42.9 44.0 
Total 100 100 
Source: Tigre et alli (1999a) 
According to Table 4, producing sectors linked to final consumption have 
increased their share in manufacturing production - largely an outcome of the 
wealth effect that followed price stabilisation - whereas the relative weight of 
the producers of capital goods fell to almost half in the same period. 
Thirdly, and as far as foreign trade is concerned, the share of Brazilian 
products in total world exports remained throughout the 1990s close to 1%, 
less than the 1.5% it reached in the mid-1980s. The highest rates of growth of 
exports between 1990 and 1996 were achieved by sugar and wood (19%), 
meat (14%), chemical products (14%), vegetable oils and vehicles and their 
parts (about 9% each). Table 5 illustrates the argument, for groups of 
products. 
According to Table 5, the share of agricultural products remained constant 
throughout the decade^^ whereas mining products corresponded in 1995-97 
to an even smaller share than in 1990. The more important and more dynamic 
part of exports are to be found in traditional industrialised products, followed 
by rather small gains in participation also for durable goods and products 
associated with the diffusion of technical progress. 
Tigre et alli {1999a). 
The most dynamic segment in the present technological paradigm. For the sake of 
comparison suffice it to say that in Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong the share 
of electronic industries was on average 16%, in the same year. 
"Although much lower than in the 1980s. This point is discussed later on. 
Table 5 - Brazil - Export Composition (%) According to Type of Goods 
1 9 8 0 - 1997 
1980 1990 1995-97 
Primary Goods 28.9 19.7 17.4 
of which: 
Agricultural 20.0 10.8 11.0 
Mining 8.9 8.9 6.2 
Energy 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Industrial Products 69.7 79.1 81.2 
of which: 
Traditional Products 36.2 28.7 31.8 
Durable Goods 6.7 6.8 8.3 
Diffusion of Technical 
Progress 10.8 12.8 13.7 
Other ind. Products 16.0 30.8 27.4 
Other Products 1.4 1.2 1.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: CEPAL(1999) 
As a whole, therefore, the low dynamism of Brazilian exports in the 1990s is 
apparently associated to the pattern of specialisation: notwithstanding the 
higher share of industrial products, the export bill is largely characterised by 
the export of natural resources-intensive commodities and energy-intensive or 
labour-intensive products^". 
An economic environment more open to trade had implications also for the 
multiplier effects of foreign trade. For instance, Tigre et alii (1999) have found 
that for sectors such as ceramics and steel - in the production of which the 
country has (static) comparative advantage - trade opening did not challenge 
local producers®', and was actually instrumental for developing a network of 
local suppliers. For other sectors - such as automobiles and 
telecommunications - which depend less on such endowment of resources 
the exposure to imported competitive products coupled to easier access to 
capital goods and inputs produced elsewhere has meant a new challenge and 
actually led to a disruption of the links with local suppliers, affecting therefore 
the possibility of inducing research in product and process development. 
The consequences of these movements - price stabilisation, strong domestic 
demand and investment in specific sectors - for the labour market have been 
varied. Until the beginning of 1995 total employment grew, as a net outcome 
of the increase in the number of workers in commerce and services and in the 
^̂  As illustrated, for instance, by tlie remarkable export performance of pulp, paper, orange 
juice, soya and semi-processed mineral products. 
The ceramics sector is actually a very successful story of restructuration leading to an 
increase in tlie number of patents, more expenditures in R&D and a number of other positive 
effects. 
informal sector, more than compensating the reduction in employment in the 
industrial sector and in agriculture. 
The participation of industrial employment in total employment fell from 25% 
to 16% between 1990 and 1997^1 Almost all of this change in the sector 
structure of employment is associated to the migration of workers from the 
manufacturing sector into the commerce and service sectors^\ by and large 
associated to the new technologies and to (low) labour costs^'. Table 6 
illustrates the urban occupational structure by sectors. 
Table 6 - Brazil: Urban Occupational Structure by Sectors - 1990-1996 
(%) 
1990 1996 
Agriculture and Mining 6.8 8.7 
Manufacturing 25.2 16.0 
Housing 1.0 7.5 
Transportation & 
Communications 4.8 4.6 
Commerce and Services 62.2 63.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Source; CEPAL (1999) 
It comes out from Table 6 that the reduction of employment in manufacturing 
has been compensated by an increase in labour absorption in housing and 
commerce and services^'. 
Industrial employment has been falling since 1995 (in spite of output growth), 
whereas employment in the commerce and service sectors increased up to 
the end of 1996, stagnating since then. In other words, at the beginning of the 
process of price stabilisation the increase in employment in the service sector 
more than compensated the fall in industrial employment, but that happened 
only until 1997. As a result, by the end of the decade there has been higher 
and increasing open unemployment: according to IBGE open unemployment 
increased from 4.3% in 1990 to 7.6 % in 1998 (Chart 4). 
^̂  There was also a reduction of employment in agriculture, to be discussed later on. 
" This migratory process was also facilitated by another structural characteristic of the 
Brazilian labour market: on average between 2.5% and 3% of industrial worl<ers change job 
every month; about 40% of the workers in the industrial sector have been in the same 
occupation by less than two years, thanks to the legislation regulating payments following 
dismissals (See Amadeo/Gonzaga (1997)) and Amadeo/Neri (1997) for more details. 
The increase in labour costs in the industrial sector (55%) between 1994 and 1997 
surpassed the corresponding increase in the services sector (15%) (Camargo (1998)). 
" Figures relative to agriculture in Table 5 reflect apparently the significant increase in the 
number of self-employed workers: the share of rural wage-earning workers has fallen from 
44% of total employment in this sector in 1990 to 34% in 1996, whereas the number of self-
employed workers increased from 53% to 64% in the same period (Cepal (1999)). 
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Brazil: Open Unemployment Rate (%) In Metropolitan 
Areas - 1982-1998 
_ 6 
S5 4 ^ 2 
0 
^^ ^^ ̂ ^^ 
In general there has been a clear shock of productivity both in the industrial 
sector and in the services sector of the Brazilian economy, although this has 
been more intense in the former®^ Previous references to productivity gains 
reflected in labour/output ratios are confirmed by other indicators, such as the 
evolution of the Initial wage of hired workers®' as well as the number of years 
of formal study by industrial workers^l 
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Real income of urban workers was not reduced throughout the period: 1) 
stabilisation and opening favoured relatively the prices of non-tradable goods; 
2) while this favouring persisted the real income of workers in services 
increased; 3) when (i) employment in both manufacturing and services started 
to lose momentum, 00 open unemployment started to rise and (iii) relative 
prices stopped favouring the products of these sectors, real income of the 
workers in services started to fall systematically; but 4) in the industrial sector. 
Which might lead to an increasing disparity of wages between the two sectors in the future 
(Camargo/Neri/Reis (1998)). 
Taken as an indicator of marginal productivity of the labour force, it indicates that between 
1995 and 1997 the gains in productivity were 45% in the industrial sector and 33% in the 
services sector (Camargo/Neri/Reis (1998)) 
The percentage of workers with less than four years of study fell from 38% in 1989 to 31% 
in 1996, whereas the percentage of workers with more than 8 years of study increased from 
42% to 49% of the labour force (Camargo/Neri/Reis (1998)). 
while employment fell the real income of workers increased until 1998, rising 
the real cost of labour in this sector (Chart 5)''. 
Adjustment in the labour market to an economic environment open to trade 
and with stable prices involved therefore the movement of workers from 
tradable into non-tradable sectors. This is consistent with previous 
considerations relative to the increasing capital-intensity of production that 
followed trade opening. 
So far for the urban sectors. Until the mid-80s the agricultural sector 
experienced a period of continued governmental intervention, and was 
instrumental to the growth process by providing food supply at low cost. Since 
the second half of that decade however agriculture has lost its major 
compensatory mechanism, the (highly subsidised) official credit programs, as 
part of the fiscal adjustment process. 
In the new (post-1990) environment - where the agricultural sector is exposed 
to international competition and lacks official credit - the major explanatory 
factor for output growth has been sharp systematic increase in productivity: 
the loss of easy credit led producers to reduce average costs via sharp 
productivity growth coupled to a moderate reduction in cultivated area and a 
significant reduction of jobs. 
For the most important goods productivity in 1996-98 had varied quite 
substantially in comparison to 1990-92: Cotton had an increase in productivity 
of 26%, Soya 29%, Coffee 27%, Corn 30%, and Beans 21%'°. Indicators of 
productivity for the agricultural sector as a whole indicate a systematic 
increase from 1987 to 1998: the yearly rate of increase for such indicator is 
close to 1.8%". 
Such impressive productivity growth was favoured by: a) the poor 
infrastructure for transportation has led to more intensive land exploitation, 
with areas closer to urban centres becoming more intensely used for 
production; b) increasing use of new domestic technologies'^; c) increasing 
professionalism of the labour force, associated, among other things, with the 
migratory movements from the Southern States to the Western and Northern 
regions of the country; d) trade opening having reduced input costs 
(Dias/Amaral (1999)), 
To partially compensate the social burden of such adjustment in the 
agricultural sector the government has accelerated the agrarian reform 
programs and created a credit program for small household agricultural 
production. But as far as income generation is concerned one of the most 
A 30% increase between 1994 and 1997 (Cannargo/Neri/Reis (1998)). 
Data from Dias/Amaral (1999)). 
" In the cattle-raising subsector a similar figure obtains, with an annual increase in 
productivity close to 1.9%. (Dias/Amaral (1999)). 
" Mostly developed by Embrapa - Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuaria, linked to 
the Ministry of Agriculture. 
important compensatory measures has been the reform of the social security 
system, allowing for retirement of rural workers. 
An important element for the sustained growth of output in the agricultural 
sector has been the improvement of that sector's terms of trade. Between 
1987 and 1994 (peak year) the terms of trade in agriculture increased 46%. 
Profitability in the sector increased 59% between 1987 and 1998, reflecting an 
increase of 22% in productivity and 31% in the index of the terms of trade of 
the agricultural sector®^. It is this advantage - measured in terms of 
productivity and improved terms of trade - what has helped producers using 
new technologies to find substitutes for the traditional rural credit. 
The general picturing that comes out from these figures is that the agricultural 
sector has adjusted itself via higher productivity coupled to increasing 
capital/output ratio and selectivity of producers, all of which imposes an 
additional burden on the urban labour market. 
These indicators suggest that Brazil is about to complete its set of so-called 
first generation reforms. These new conditions impose, on their turn, new 
challenges in that different conditions are required for the very sustainability of 
the results obtained so far, leading to what has been called a second 
generation of reforms. 
These comprise further steps, for instance, in reforming the social security 
policy. Experience has shown that as it stands the social security system is 
bound to present impressive deficits in the coming years, and even more so 
when domestic economic activity is low, providing reduced fiscal revenue. For 
the system to be in equilibrium over time a number of additional measures 
have yet to be adopted. 
Fiscal constraints throughout most of the decade have led to adjustment of 
the public sector via expenditure cuts. There are clear limits for that, not least 
in terms of the very efficiency of the services provided by governmental 
agencies. Multiplicity of agencies with overlapping functions, geographical 
concentration of public servants, differences in wage levels are some of the 
aspects that call for sound administrative reform. Some steps have been 
taken in that direction with a number of measures mostly associated to the 
control of expenditures. But little doubt remains about the need for additional 
reforms. 
Labour market has been shown to be also subject to a number of constraints 
imposed by a legislation which in several aspects dates back to the thirties. 
Trade union representation, their actual financing, incentives to mobility 
among different activities are all part of the same package of difficulties that 
have to be dealt with soon. 
Other reforms which are also often demanded have to do with the functioning 
of the judiciary system - costly and slow moving - as well as with the very 
" Dias Amaral (1999). 
means of political representation and decision, via the (historically 
unprecedented) creation of mechanisms through which citizens feel actually 
represented and with active voice. This requires some deep changes in the 
party political structure and electoral legislation. 
These are necessary steps that will have to be taken if the Brazilian economy 
and society are to become mature and open to relations with the rest of the 
world. But these further reforms are more complex by nature and require far 
more time and political consensus than those achieved so far. 
IV - What Did Not Work? Do We Know Why? 
The Brazilian experience with reforms is a rather rich one. Reforms had (ex-
post) a well-defined sequencing, they were varied, and mostly simultaneous 
to a stabilisation program. 
Little doubt remains about the 1990s having been a period of remarkable 
changes in the Brazilian economy, with several of the so-called first 
generation reforms having been almost completed. A number of indicators 
show however that not everything went the way one would have expected. 
To start with, the two intensification episodes of the process of import tariff 
reduction that took place in 1990 and 1994 were mostly designed as part of 
price stabilisation programs. As a consequence, the phasing down of tariff 
rates was neither instantaneous nor a linear process over time. Several 
sectors had to face instead a sequencing of increases and reductions of tariff 
rates in relatively short periods of t ime'\ This mixed signalling imposes a 
burden on investors and consumers of imported goods. 
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Baumann et alii (1997) have shown that for a number of products there were up to 8 
changes of nominal tariff rates in a 26-months period from July 1994 to September 1996. In 
some cases nominal tariff rates oscillated between 0% and 19% (between 19% and 73% for 
some other products) and those changes were repeatedly in both directions (i.e., a 
sequencing of increases and reductions). 
One of the most frequent criticisms in relation to the stabilisation policy 
adopted in 1994 is that looking back after five years since its adoption it turns 
out that the program has remained essentially a stabilisation program. It 
lacked a medium- to long-term strategy. Economic policy remained 
subordinated to this major goal, and this was not costless. 
Exchange rate was kept below equilibrium levels on the grounds that: i) 
economic 'fundamentals' have changed with price stabilisation (hence parity 
criteria had to be reconsidered a on new basis), ii) exchange rate devaluation 
would have imposed cost pressures (thus impairing the stabilisation process), 
and iii) the more sound macroeconomic scenario would assure the 
attractiveness of the economy to foreign investors. As shown in Chart 6, 
competitiveness (measured in terms of parity) deteriorated until mid-1996. 
Interventions in the foreign exchange market via adjustment of bands or intra-
band intervals were defined by variations in wholesale price indexes, on the 
grounds that: a) in stabilization processes the prices of services typically 
present a slower process of adaptation to foreign prices than the prices of 
those goods exposed to foreign competition; b) the relevant indicators are 
those associated to competitiveness of tradeable goods; c) given the 
magnitude of changes in the process of price formation, there would be no 
reason to take as references the price levels previous to the Real Plan. 
As Chart 6 shows, the overvaluation of the Real was more pronounced when 
considered in terms of consumer prices. Such overvaluation has been 
reduced since 1997, when the government started to signal the need to 
change the exchange rate gradually in accordance to domestic inflation, but 
external pressure called for sharper variation of the exchange rate in 1999. 
The positive effects on competitiveness stemming from trade reform were 
expected to generate positive export performance. It is still not quite clear the 
extent to which the easier access to import goods has helped export growth. 
In any case, high domestic interest rates affected the production of exportable 
goods, and wage increase plus exchange rate overvaluation have negatively 
affected traders. At the same time, demand for imports boomed. As a result, 
large trade deficits obtained. 
The literature surveyed in Section II would suggest that this procedure might 
have been part of the government's strategy to gain credibility to its reform 
program. It is not clear, however, the amount of time required by the credibility 
argument: exchange rate policy was essentially maintained with only minor 
changes during four and a half years. 
On the monetary side, in the first half of the nineties domestic debt was 
financed via bonds with fixed interest rates. Since the Real Plan, price 
stabilisation coupled to the inflow of foreign capital have led authorities to 
change their financing structure into a predominance (75%) of bonds with 
flexible interest rates and dollar-indexed bonds (21%). Continued use of 
monetary policy and restrained exchange rate were instrumental to sustain 
price stability, but the maintenance of high interest rates this policy mix 
requires has fostered public debt, and the government has not been able to 
make the necessary changes in policy. 
This is not to say that there were no efforts to increase revenue: fiscal 
revenue increased from 25% of GDP in 1993 to 30% in 1998, and 'primary''^ 
fiscal results were positive throughout the second half of the decade. The 
problem is to be found in the expenditure side, and especially as a 
consequence of the variation of domestic interest rates: in 1998 payment of 
interest rates on domestic public debt corresponded to 44% of total fiscal 
revenue. 
An overvalued exchange rate stimulated importers' demand for foreign 
currency. Changes in the legislation, price stabilisation and renewed access 
to international capital markets led to massive inflow of foreign capital (loans 
and portfolio investment initially, followed by foreign direct investment). 
The outcome has been a vicious circle of foreign currency inflow being 
monetised and having to be neutralised via higher interest rates. These, on 
their turn, pressed fiscal accounts, leading to higher debt, need for new loans 
and hence even higher interest rates. Table 7 shows the several components 
of fiscal deficit. 
Two aspects are worth noting in Table 7. First, interests on domestic and 
external debt explained most of the deficit by the end of the decade. Second, 
the monetisation that took place at the beginning of the stabilisation process 
was replaced by domestic and external bond selling as sources of public 
financing. 
Table 7 - Brazil - Main Components of Fiscal Deficit (% of GDP) 
1994 1998 
'Operational' Fiscal Deficit -1.4 7.5 
Uses 
'Primary' Deficit -5.3 -0.0 
Interests on Domestic Debt 3.2 7.2 
Interests on External Debt 07 0.3 
Sources 
Domestic Financing -2.6 4.5 
External Financing -3.0 2.2 
iVIonetary Expansion 4.3 0.8 
Source: Centrai Bank Bulletin, i\/lay/99 
95 That is, excluding monetary correction and the payment of interest rates. 
Reliance on externa! savings has been a mixed blessing. It has helped to 
finance public debt, as shown in Table 7, but at the same time the increase in 
external savings rate after 1994 (from 0.9% to 4.4% of GDP in 1998; see 
Chart 7) financed mostly consumption. Investment rate increased from 15% to 
18%'^ in those four years", but most of it was essentially modernising 
projects, not productive capacity expansion^®. Between 1993 and 1996 private 
consumption explained 72% of the increase in aggregate demand, whereas 
capital formation corresponded to only 22%®®. 
The privatisation programme contributed to deal with this background of 
incomplete fiscal adjustment via the sale of public firms and the relief of the 
fiscal burden imposed by inefficient state-owned enterprises. Whatever the 
consequences for productive efficiency, however, two side effects are worth 
noting. 
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Some firms were sold even before the regulation of their sector was complete, 
and this might negatively affect competition in the domestic market. On the 
other hand, privatisation of several important firms was initially the outcome of 
financial arbitrage movements, involving agents not directly involved in the 
productive activity, and - until recently - a limited participation of foreign 
investors. Efficiency gains might as a consequence be not as high as planned 
or it might take some time until changes in ownership provide the conditions 
for competitiveness. 
Even though one of the objectives of the privatisation programme seemed to 
be to maximise revenue, and despite the impressive amount of resources 
involved, a large public debt remained, due mostly to the public sector wage 
bill (9% of GDP in 1997), social security deficit (9.4% of GDP) and real 
interest rates (3.4% of GDP)'"". 
At constant 1980 prices. 
" Mostly by the private sector: public investment in machinery and equipment was reduced 
from 0.7% in 1994 to only 0.4% in 1998, whereas for investment in construction those rates 
were 2.9% and 1.8%, respectively, according to IBGE. 
Reliance on external financing also raised total external debt by 47% in four years, from 
US$ 151 billion in 1994 to US$ 222 billion in 1998. 
"Sáinz/Calcagno(1999). 
'°°Cysne (1998). 
Privatisation of public firms, coupled to changes in regulation and elimination 
of public monopoly in several sectors have improved private capital activity. 
But private capital has become more active only in the productive sector. Its 
contribution to social expenditures has remained quite limited. Although 
private firms and NGOs have for quite some time participated in the provision 
of social services, most of It remains still very much a public sector activity. 
The level of social expenditure in Brazil is quite comparable to most medium-
income countries - about 19% of GDP, although unfairly distributed - and 
reforms have not been able so far to alter significantly the origin and 
composition of revenues: in spite of Constitutional changes, social 
expenditure remain dependent (58% in 1996) upon funds formed by social 
contributions"". 
Furthermore, aggregate social indicators suggest that there is still a long way 
to go in this area. Price stabilisation and public transfers have provided 
significant positive effects. Real income of employed workers increased 30% 
between 1993 and 1997, due essentially to: a) sharp increase in transfers to 
households at all income levels and b) changes in relative prices that have 
reduced the price of basic products. As a consequence, between 1990 and 
1996 the share of households below poverty line fell from 41% to 29%'°^ 
which is an undisputed positive indicator. 
Insofar as income equality is concerned Neri/Camargo (1999) estimations -
using PNAD^°^ data - confirm the well-known high income concentration in 
Brazil, and find relatively small variation in the indicators of inequality between 
1990 and 1997 (the coefficients are almost stable, when one allows for the 
margin of error in this type of indicators). This result is achieved using both a 
Theil-T index (0.748 in 1990 and 0.715 in 1997 for all income sources) or a 
Gini coefficient (0.607 in 1990 and 0.595 in 1997 for all income sources)^°^ 
Moreover, most of the reduction in inequality measures obtained in Brazil in 
21 years (1976-1997) took place in 1993-1997. 
Neri/Camargo (1999) also show that detailed computation of primary PNAD 
data calls for a qualification of these results. This fall in overall inequality 
indicators does not reflect an improvement in income distribution: the share of 
the richest strata of the population in total income remains very high and the 
individuals in those strata have accrued most of the gains stemming from a 
number of effects, such as those associated with better payment for more 
Resources remain concentrated in specific areas: federal government concentrates 2/3 of 
its resources in social security and benefits to public servants; local states concentrate their 
resources on education, benefits to public servants and health, whereas municipalities have 
% of their social expenditures in education, housing, health and sewage and water supply. 
The reduction being from 36% to 25% in urban areas and from 64% to 46% in rural areas. 
Data from CEPAL(1999). 
PNAD - Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilio. 
Alternative methodologies using a different unit for analysis - as in CEPAL (1999) - also 
indicate quite high degree of concentration with relatively small variation during the 1990s: in 
1990 the Gini coefficients were 0.528 for urban areas and 0.456 for rural areas, only slightly 
lower than the corresponding 1997 coefficients of 0.538 and 0.460, respectively. 
qualified workers, better payment by type of activity, financial gains obtained 
from the high interest rates, and others. Several tests indicate that the 
improvement in those inequality indicators are an outcome of wealth effects 
following from the lower cost of consumption basket as well as the reduction 
of volatility of workers' income following from price stabilisation. There has 
hardly been any significant structural change in the profile of income 
distribution in this period. 
Be that as it may, the significant number of households that crossed poverty 
line has had a major impact on domestic aggregate demand. As a 
consequence, imports boomed, at the same time that aggregate investment 
rate increased, by and large to meet domestic demand. 
In most industries investment increased significantly in 1995-97 as compared 
to 1990-95. But except for telecommunications it remained below the levels 
observed in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s there is clearly a new 
investment model, probably more efficient from the microeconomic viewpoint, 
but not instrumental in terms of productive capacity and economic growth. 
Furthermore, investment has been more intense in those sectors that 
remained somehow protected from foreign competition (such as consumer 
durables), with highest productivity, and where the presence of transnational 
companies is more intense. 
Apart from manufacturing the record of investment is mixed. In the mining 
industry there has been very limited investment (due to the relatively low 
knowledge of available resources, and poor market perspectives for those 
minerals with known reserves), the same occurring in the petroleum industry. 
Productive and distributive bottlenecks are so widespread that they have 
become to be known as "Brazil Cost", meaning overall inefficiency costs 
imposed by specific inadequacies. Investment in infrastructure is also a mix of 
successes and failures. Modernisation of ports is under way, since their 
privatisation, but at the same time there has been relatively small investment 
in railways and equipment, and several constraints remain in the railway 
system, due to the lack of integration with other transportation facilities. 
Private investment is also starting to improve conditions in a number of roads, 
but this is still a troubled sector, since only a few motorways in the country are 
likely to be privatised, given the expected private profitability. 
The most impressive performance has taken place in telecommunications, 
with an unprecedented amount of investment associated to privatisation. At 
the same time, however, there has been a mediocre performance in electric 
power, leading to insufficient supply and even risk of blackouts. In sewage 
and water supply there has been an Important recovery of investments since 
1996, but there might be some future constraints led by financial difficulties 
and high indebtedness of firms in the sector. 
From the viewpoint of industrial policy, therefore, reforms have allowed only a 
partial success in the improvement of infrastructure. As shown, output growth 
could resume for some time, but increasing doubts remain as to the resulting 
productive structure and its long-term perspectives, insofar as the economy's 
insertion in the international division of labour is concerned'°^ 
In general firms tried to adjust themselves to import competition via defensive 
specialisation strategies, often affecting negatively the local production of 
parts and products with higher technological contents. The process of 
adjustment of the industrial sector fostered competitiveness in those sectors 
that are intensive in gains from scale and use labour intensely. Facility to 
import capital goods has stimulated the modernisation of sectors with low 
technological dynamism 
In 1991-93 a number of measures led to facilitating the import of technology. 
But the utilisation of foreign technology has traditionally not been 
accompanied by a domestic technological effort other than the adaptation of 
such technologies to local conditions'°\ Only a limited number of firms have 
R&D activities, and technological links outside the firm are rather limited, not 
only among firms but also between them and universities and research 
institutions. An industrial sector excessively heterogeneous makes it harder to 
establish technical relation among firms. 
More capital-intensive production processes with higher import content have 
also contributed to add a structural component to the increase in open 
unemployment: even when the economy resume an output growth trajectory, 
the reduction in open unemployment is slower than in previous periods. The 
period of time that the average worker remains unemployed increased from 
3.5 months in 1991 to 6 months in 1998"". 
This is favoured by labour legislation'^^ As a consequence, 3% of the workers 
in the manufacturing sector change job every month, reducing the incentives 
for labour training, and adding to the difficulties previously mentioned, with 
regard to local technological efforts. 
The effects of adjustment were felt also in the rural area. Reduced credit, 
trade liberalisation and an overvalued foreign exchange have provoked 
significant changes in the relative prices of agricultural products. 
There are concerns also with regard to the actual involvement of producers with the 
exporting activity: only some 14 thousand firms have systematic operations with the foreign 
market, out of a total that surpass one million registered firms. 
Balance of Payments data show an increase in the import of technology in the 1990s, with 
a significant change in its composition: the share of imports of 'specialised technical services' 
in total imports of technology fell from 67% in 1990 to 32% in 1996, with a simultaneous sharp 
increase in payments for 'use of patents', and 'supply of industrial technology' (for non-
patented technologies). This reflects an increase in importing and transferring foreign 
technology, without a corresponding increase in the expenditure in R&D by local firms (Tigre 
et alii (1999)). 
Camargo/Neri/Reis (1999). 
When the economy is growing and unemployment rate is low there is an'implicit incentive 
for workers to provoke their dismissal, as they receive a payment corresponding to one 
monthly wage plus 40% of a fund accumulated by the firm (FGTS - formed by one wage per 
year employed in the firm) (Amadeo/Gonzaga (1997)). 
The agricultural sector adjusted itself by trying alternative forms of internal 
capitalisation, mostly associated to sharp increase in productivity, cost cutting 
and reduction of assets. As a consequence, there has been massive 
unemployment'"'. 
The impressive increase in demand for food"° following stabilisation was met 
by an increase in domestic food supply fostered by the significant reduction in 
imported input costs. This characteristic, coupled to the sharp reduction of 
official credit, has proven to be highly discriminatory against smaller 
producers, users of more traditional technologies. The elimination of 
producers with productivity levels below average contributes additionally to 
increase open unemployment rates. 
The questions that follow from this picturing and the dissatisfaction with the 
results have to do with the reforms having been incomplete, incorrectly 
implemented or whether inappropriate signals were given to economic agents. 
V - Lessons from the Brazilian Experience 
The reforms that have taken place in Brazil since the late 1980s are quite 
illustrative in several aspects. To start with, these reforms have at least two 
characteristics not considered by the usual models: a) they have taken place 
in parallel with a process of regional integration (Mercosur), and the 
commitments associated to that process were significant, at least for foreign 
trade policies; b) Brazil is a federative structure, and this has strong 
implications for the outcomes of several reforms, such as the reforms of the 
social security system and the financial sector. 
As suggested by Chart I, Section III, the sequencing of reforms has 
apparently corresponded to the recommendations found in the literature: trade 
reform has preceded every other reform. But there were clearly two stages -
until mid-1994 and thereafter, the turning point having been the adoption of a 
sharp domestic price stabilisation program. 
In other words, trade reform started in a moment when the economy still 
presented acute macroeconomic imbalances - so the benefits transmitted via 
relative prices could not be maximised - and then was accelerated in parallel 
with a stabilisation program. 
This simultaneity of opening and disinflation is more familiar to the literature 
about reforms. 
" " it Is estimated that the number of workers in the agricultural sector was reduced by 23% 
between 1985 and 1996 (corresponding to 5.5 million jobs), whereas the sector output grew 
30% in the same period. 
" " The purchasing power of urban workers in relation to the cost of food and apparel 
increased more than 60% since 1990, with the wages of less qualified urban workers 
surpassing the variation of food prices. 
Indicators shown here indicate that opening has actually helped stabilisation 
and fostered producer and consumer surpluses via the access to import 
goods. The simultaneity of exchange rate overvaluation required for 
stabilisation purposes affected both the trade balance and the relative price of 
tradable and non-tradable goods. As a result, trade deficit developed and 
there was a stimulus to factor movement towards the production of non-
tradable goods^^\ 
It is conceded that during stabilisation programs the maintenance of an 
overvalued exchange rate might be a cost to be paid, if it is part of the 
government strategy to show fierce commitment to reforming. The alternative 
social cost of losing credibility in the reforms could be much higher. The 
question posed by the Brazilian experience is, however, that such policy 
remained for quite a long period, well beyond the period of time one would 
have considered as necessary to induce credibility. 
As an outcome, this has led to increasing concern in terms of long-term 
growth. Signalling to economic agents has concentrated in stabilisation 
purposes. Not much has been done in terms of the conditions for resuming 
growth, except for the expected efficiency effects stemming from privatisation 
and trade opening. As a result, investment has increased as a whole, and is 
more efficient in microeconomic terms, but the amount actually invested is not 
sufficient from a viewpoint of a long-term growth strategy (increase in 
productive capacity has been limited) nor does it give much hope in terms of 
export performance. 
It has been shown also that the literature on reforms indicates that the reform 
of the domestic financial sector should come before the dismantling of 
controls over foreign capital. The Brazilian experience has been peculiar also 
in this regard. Incentives to foreign investment were adopted in 1990-91, 
whereas the actual reform of the financial sector only took place in 1995, after 
adjustments became necessary due to the loss of inflationary gains that 
accrued to the banking sector. That reform has not induced a reduction in 
interest rates, as one might have expected. Instead, there has been a vicious 
circle of capital inflows coupled to fiscal deficit leading to higher rates, which 
attracted new capital, and so on. 
In terms of the models reviewed in Section II, when lack of faith in the 
permanence of reforms is coupled to access to external financing the private 
sector incurs debt to finance anticipated consumption. The Brazilian 
experience shows a different story. The same effect of increasing external 
debt essentially to finance domestic consumption occurred in a context of 
relatively low investment but intense domestic demand, even when there were 
little doubts with regard to the government intentions (as illustrated by the 
series of political gains the government has accumulated). 
Very much in the way an absorption approach model with fixed exchange rate would have 
predicted: a displacement of the production frontier with relative prices benefitting the 
production of non-tradeable goods. 
The basic recipes regarding structural adjustment would also indicate that 
public expenditures should concentrate in health, education and 
infrastructure, leaving all other activities to the private initiative. 
This is perhaps the aspect where the federative structure of the Brazilian 
society comes out more clearly as determining the outcomes. Sections III and 
IV have shown that a number of aspects have changed in the structure of 
public financing. But evidence also shows that: a) the commitment of the 
private sector with financing in these areas is slow and limited and b) there 
are structural constraints that condition the extent to which it is possible to 
transfer expenditures from the federal government to local states and 
municipalities. Pursuing such reforms require a re-designing of the whole 
fiscal structure. 
This latter aspect, coupled to the indications of rigidities in the labour market 
imposed by legislation and to the increasingly evident costs involved in the 
way the judiciary and parliamentary powers operate lead to the conclusion 
that there is no partial reforming. Once initiated, if the reforming process is to 
remain, there is need of a continuous deepening and spreading of the process 
itself. 
In summary, one might identify (at least) seven lessons that can be derived 
from the Brazilian experience in the 1990s: 
1.There are clear gains accruing from the end of inflation but the outcome 
depends on how stabilisation is sustained. 
Brazil has not adopted i) a repressive scheme, such as in Chile in the 80s or 
Argentina (with the Bonex and reduction of nominal wages) nor ii) a 
negotiated procedure, such as in Mexico and Israel. Instead, in the Brazilian 
experience since the mid-1990s, there has been a) nominal exchange rate 
anchor, b) high positive real interest rates, c) real wage repression in the 
public sector, coupled to d) quantitative adjustment in the labour market, all of 
which impose the costs of impairing competitiveness and performance in the 
medium-to-long run. 
2.Trade opening has increased producers and consumers surpluses, as 
theory would have suggested. But the way opening took place seems to have 
imposed excessively high costs to some sectors. 
3.Fiscal adjustment is a must, if one wants to avoid excessively high interest 
rates and resume public sector actions. But adjustment should be devised in 
such a way as not to impair productive efficiency nor impose excessive social 
costs: private financing of social expenditure is neither immediate nor granted. 
4.Adjustment of the financial sector is crucial, in a worid of intense capital 
movement: the Brazilian process has cost less in terms of GDP than similar 
processes in other countries and has been apparently instrumental in avoiding 
the multiplier effects of recent external crises. 
õ.Although important, price stabilisation sliould not become tlie unique goal of 
economic policy. Experience does show that it takes some time until 
inflationary expectations die out"^. But a correct signalling to economic 
agents with regard to resuming output is as important, in order to assure the 
very conditions for the reforms to be sustainable over time. 
6.Once Initiated, the process of reform calls for its own continuity at each time 
higher stages, if a reversal is to be avoided. Therefore, economic contexts 
with low inflation and open economic relations with the rest of the world call 
for fiscal fitness and for changes in labour legislation as well as modifications 
in administrative and institutional procedures. 
7.Relying on external savings to resume an investment cycle is a risky bet, 
since decisions by foreign investors are taken on the grounds of what 
happens to domestic variables, but include also facts that take place 
elsewhere. 
The intensity and multiplicity of the reforms undertaken in Brazil in the 1990s 
were such that it is perhaps still early to fully appraise them. A number of 
policy changes - such as the privatisation of public enterprises and the reform 
of the social security system - are bound to be translated into dynamic gains 
only after some time. But it is now nine years since the first significant 
movements have taken place, and certainly some of the lessons that can 
already be identified contribute to our understanding of the adjustment 
process in a developing economy. 
The Brazilian experience illustrates a case where reforms did not follow the 
prescribed ideal sequencing, where In some cases there were inadequate 
signalling to economic agents, but also where the gains that have been 
achieved might be easily lost in the case of a reversal of these movements. 
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